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A SIX STEP ANALYSIS OF "OTHER PURPOSES"
EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 404(b) OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF EVIDENCE
PROFESSOR T. M. RINGER, JR.*t
I. INTRODUCTION
The accused is on trial for the murder of Z. The prosecution offers
evidence that on two prior occasions, the accused murdered X and Y.
Defense counsel objects. How should the trial judge rule on the ob-
jection to the introduction of the extrinsic acts of murder?
The answer to this question depends upon a systematic examination
of a series of interrelated factual, evidentiary and substantive law con-
siderations. The primary focus of this analysis is Rule 404(b) of the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence which reads as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.'
If the sole purpose for introducing evidence that the accused previ-
ously murdered X and Y is to prove his predisposition to commit mur-
der, then the offers of proof of the collateral murders would be
excluded by Rule 404(a), the so-called "propensity rule."2 If, on the
other hand, evidence of the prior murders is being offered for some
other material purpose in dispute, such as intent or motive, then evi-
dence of the prior murders might be admissible pursuant to Rule
404(b), known as the "other purposes" clause.
Although Rule 404(b) does not lend itself to a simple or mechanical
application, this article discusses a six-step process that courts in
North Carolina should follow in determining the admissibility of
"other purposes" evidence. First, the proponent of the "other pur-
* B.A. Morehouse College, 1967; J.D. Harvard University, 1970; Professor and Director
of the Clinical Legal Experience Program at North Carolina Central University School of Law.
t The author would like to thank his able assistant Mrs. Jimmie Hudson, now retired and
his present assistant Eamestine Goods. He would also like to thank his research assistants Don
Ferguson and Ernest Collins. In addition, the author would like to thank Lisa McDow, Jonathan
Babb and Johanna Finkelstein.
1. N.C. R. Evm. 404(b).
2. N.C. R. EvID. 404(a).
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poses" evidence should identify the specific purpose for which the col-
lateral wrong, crime or act is being offered pursuant to Rule 404(b).
Second, the trial court should determine if the offer of proof is logi-
cally relevant and if it supports a material proposition pursuant to
Rule 401 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Third, the trial
court should determine whether the proponent of the collateral
wrong, crime or act has produced sufficient evidence to prove that the
extrinsic act was committed by the defendant or the party in question.
Fourth, if the defendant or party has been previously acquitted of hav-
ing committed the collateral crime, then the trial court should deter-
mine if evidence of that crime would be precluded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution or by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. Fifth, the trial court should, pursuant to Rule 403 of the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence, weigh the probative value of the
extrinsic evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice that might
arise from the introduction of that evidence. Sixth, the court should
decide whether to provide a limiting instruction to the jury pursuant
to Rule 105 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence to guard against
confusion of the issues and misuse of the collateral evidence by the
jury.
In discussing this six-step process, this analysis of Rule 404(b) will
examine three recent North Carolina Supreme Court decisions that
have addressed the admissibility of "other purposes" evidence pursu-
ant to Rule 404(b). In State v. Agee,' the court upheld the admission
of evidence relating to a prior offense even though the defendant had
been acquitted of that offense. The court relied upon the "chain of
circumstances" or res gestae doctrine to support the admission of the
prior offense evidence.4
In State v. Stager,5 the court upheld the murder conviction of the
defendant-wife for the murder by firearm of her second husband.
During the trial of that case, the prosecution was allowed to offer evi-
dence surrounding the death by firearm of defendant-wife's first hus-
band. The court upheld the admission of this "other purposes"
evidence even though the defendant-wife was never charged with or
tried for the murder of her first husband and even though the death of
the first husband occurred approximately ten years prior to the death
of defendant's second husband.6
The third and most intriguing of the recent North Carolina Supreme
Court cases addressing the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence is
3. 391 S.E.2d 171 (N.C. 1990).
4. Id.
5. 406 S.E.2d 876 (N.C. 1991).
6. Id.
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State v. Scott.7 In that decision, the court reversed the kidnapping and
rape convictions of the defendant on the basis that the trial court had
improperly admitted testimony concerning a prior rape for which the
defendant had been acquitted. The court held in essence that the
prejudicial effect of admitting a prior offense for which the defendant
had been acquitted would clearly outweigh the probative value of that
evidence Pursuant to Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence.
This series of recent North Carolina Supreme Court decisions raises
numerous issues relating to the proper interpretation and application
of Rule 404(b). In Agee and Stager, the court followed a traditional
approach in admitting "other purposes" evidence pursuant to Rules
404(b), 401 and 403. The Scott decision, however, represents a signifi-
cant departure from established precedent and suggests an apparent
change in the court's analytical approach and judicial attitude regard-
ing the admissibility of collateral wrongs, crimes or acts. The Scott
decision is particularly significant since it implicitly rejects the double
jeopardy and collateral estoppel line of analysis enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Dowling v. United States.9 In fact, the
majority opinion in Scott, by Chief Justice Exum, cites the dissenting
opinion of Justice Brennan in Dowling, rather than the majority opin-
ion of Justice White, in holding that evidence of a prior alleged offense
for which the defendant had been acquitted was not admissible.' 0
The recent North Carolina Supreme Court decisions appear to
adopt, from the federal court system, the burden of production stan-
dard first applied by the United States Supreme Court in Huddleston
v. United States." In determining the quantum of proof required to
connect the defendant in a criminal case to the commission of a collat-
eral offense, the United States Supreme Court adopted the condi-
tional relevancy standard of Rule 104(b) in holding that the
prosecution must introduce sufficient evidence to support the jury's
finding of fact that the defendant committed the extrinsic act.' 2 In
Stager, the North Carolina Supreme Court cited Huddleston favorably
and the court purportedly adopted the burden of production standard
applied by the United States Supreme Court in Huddleston.13 In both
Stager and Agee, however, the court applied a "substantial evidence"
standard which, on first impression, appears to establish a higher bur-
7. 413 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 1992).
8. Id.
9. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
10. 413 S.E.2d at 787.
11. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
12. Id.
13. State v. Stager, 406 S.E.2d 876, 890 (N.C. 1991).
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den of production standard than the "sufficiency of evidence" stan-
dard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Huddleston. 14
This article is divided into a discussion of preliminary considera-
tions, followed by an examination of a proposed six-step analysis that
trial courts in North Carolina should apply in admitting or excluding
evidence of collateral wrongs, crimes or acts pursuant to Rule 404(b).
Finally, this article concludes that far too often, North Carolina courts
have failed to carefully analyze all of the relevant considerations
before ruling on the admissibility of "other purposes" evidence.
Hopefully, Scott 5 signals a transition from a perfunctory application
of Rule 404(b) to a higher standard of scrutiny and analysis in deter-
mining the admissibility of collateral offenses pursuant to Rule 404(b).
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A clear understanding of Rule 404(b) requires an initial examina-
tion of related rules that address the admissibility of character evi-
dence. According to Brandeis on North Carolina Evidence,
"[c]haracter comprises the actual qualities and characteristics of an
individual, the peculiar qualities impressed by nature and habit on the
person, which distinguish him from others."' 6  The admissibility of
character evidence depends upon the nature of the evidence and the
purpose for which it is being offered. If character is an ultimate issue
in a case, Rule 405(b) provides that proof of the particular character
trait may be made by introducing specific instances of the person's
character or by reputation or opinion evidence of the person's rele-
vant character traits. 7 Instances in which character is an ultimate is-
sue include defamation cases, claims of negligent entrustment or
negligent employment, criminal prosecutions involving carnal knowl-
edge of a virtuous female, and child custody cases.
Circumstantial character evidence, on the other hand, is generally
inadmissible to prove that at the time in question the individual acted
in conformity with his predisposed character traits. Circumstantial
character evidence is excluded by the so-called "propensity rule,"
which is codified as Rule 404(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evi-
dence.' Thus the propensity rule would normally exclude evidence
that a defendant in a murder case possesses a violent temperament or
that a defendant in a fraud case has engaged in other acts of dishon-
14. Stager, 406 S.E.2d at 890; State v. Agee, 391 S.E.2d 171 (N.C. 1991).
15. State v. Scott, 413 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 1992).
16. 1 HENRY BRANDEIS JR., BRANDEIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 102 at 454 (3d
ed. 1988).
17. N.C. R. Ev-o. 405(b).
18. N.C. R. Evi. 404(a).
[Vol. 21:1
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esty. In civil cases, evidence that a defendant in a negligence case is
careless by nature would generally be excluded by the propensity rule.
Rule 404(a), however, contains three exceptions to the exclusion of
circumstantial character evidence. First, an accused in a criminal case
may "open the door" to his pertinent character traits and the prosecu-
tion may "rebut the same" pursuant to Rule 404(a)(1). 19 Second, the
defendant in a criminal case may "open the door" to the pertinent
character traits of the victim of the crime and the prosecution may
"rebut the same" pursuant to Rule 404(a)(2).2 ° Third, the credibility
- truthfulness or untruthfulness - of every witness in either a civil
case or a criminal prosecution may be impeached 2 1 by reference to
prior bad acts of the witness pursuant to Rule 608 or to prior convic-
tions of the witness pursuant to Rule 609. As a general rule, then,
character evidence is not admissible in either criminal cases or civil
cases unless character is an ultimate issue in the case, or unless the
defendant in a case "opens the door" to his character or to the charac-
ter of the victim of the alleged crime, or unless credibility evidence is
involved in impeaching a witness in either a criminal prosecution or a
civil action.
The first sentence of Rule 404(b) restates the essence of the propen-
sity rule found in Rule 404(a). 22 The second sentence of Rule 404(b)
is known as the "other purposes" clause and provides that other
wrongs, crimes or acts of an individual may be admitted for any rele-
vant purpose except to prove that the individual acted in conformity
with his character at the time in question.23 Thus, Rule 404(b) is not
an exception to the propensity rule since evidence of an individual's
wrongs, crimes or acts offered pursuant to Rule 404(b) is not admitted
as character evidence per se. Rather, evidence of an individual's
wrongs, crimes or acts offered pursuant to Rule 404(b) is admitted for
some purpose other than to prove the character traits of the
individual.
At least one North Carolina appellate court decision has stated that
Rule 404(b) is applicable to parties in civil cases and usually to de-
fendants in criminal cases.24 The language of the rule, however, does
not limit its application to the admission of collateral wrongs of par-
ties. If in the unusual circumstance, the collateral wrongs, crimes or
acts of non-parties are material and relevant under Rule 404(b), there
is no reason to automatically exclude evidence of those events. The
19. N.C. R. EvD. 404(a)(1).
20. N.C. R. Evm. 404(a)(2).
21. N.C. R. Evm. 404(a)(3).
22. N.C. R. Evm. 404(a) & 404(b).
23. N.C. R. Evtr. 404(b).
24. State v. Morgan, 340 S.E.2d 84 (N.C. 1986).
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North Carolina Supreme Court, however, recently rejected a defend-
ant's contention that Rule 404(b) could be used to prove the collateral
acts of a non-party as circumstantial evidence that the non-party, and
not the defendant, committed the crime in question.25 In a similar
case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals recently held that a de-
fendant, who was arrested after a bag of cocaine was found under the
seat of the truck that he was driving, was not entitled to offer evidence
that the owner of the truck had been previously convicted of cocaine
possession for the purpose of showing that the owner of the truck had
probably placed the bag of cocaine under the seat.26 The court held
that the offer of proof was too speculative.27 This limitation on the
use of Rule 404(b) thus creates the anomalous result that the prosecu-
tion may introduce "other purposes" evidence to convict the defend-
ant but the defendant may not introduce "other purposes" evidence
for exculpatory purposes.
Therefore, in practice, Rule 404(b) is a prosecutor's rule that per-
mits the State to circumvent the propensity rule by introducing past
wrongs, crimes and acts of the defendant disguised as "other pur-
poses" evidence.
Many of the reported North Carolina cases that apply Rule 404(b)
involve offers of proof by the prosecution of "other purposes" evi-
dence relating to the collateral wrongs, crimes or acts of defendants in
criminal cases. This article is limited to a discussion of the application
of Rule 404(b) in criminal cases even though the rule also applies in
the trial of civil cases.
North Carolina Evidence Rule 404(b) is modeled after and tracks
the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),28 with two excep-
tions. First, the second sentence of North Carolina Rule 404(b) lists
"absence of entrapment" as a categorical other purpose, but Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b) does not list "absence of entrapment" as one
of the explicit other purposes.29 The second difference between the
North Carolina rule and the Federal rule arises from a 1991 amend-
ment to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) which was revised by adding
the following notice provision: "provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evi-
dence it intends to introduce at trial. 30
25. State v. Richardson, 402 S.E.2d 401 (N.C. 1991).
26. State v. Chandler, 398 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. 1990).
27. Id.
28. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
29. N.C. R. Evnm. 404(b), FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
30. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
[Vol. 21:1
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III. IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC "OTHER PURPOSES" WHICH THE
EVIDENCE OF OTHER WRONGS, CRIMES OR AcTS
MAY PROVE
In determining the admissibility of "other purposes" evidence, the
threshold consideration is to identify the specific purpose(s) for which
a collateral wrong, crime or act would be admissible. The second sen-
tence of Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence lists ten
"other purposes" which prior or subsequent offenses may prove:
"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident."'" In addition to the
ten categorical purposes stated in Rule 404(b), "there are numerous
other uses to which evidence of criminal acts may be put, and those
enumerated are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaus-
tive."32 Stated below are examples of the manner in which the courts
have applied Rule 404(b):
A. Motive - In the prosecution of a defendant for murder of a state
trooper, extrinsic evidence that the defendant had recently escaped
from prison was held to be admissible to prove his motive for killing
the state trooper. 33 On the other hand, in an attempted robbery pros-
ecution, extrinsic evidence that the defendant was addicted to cocaine
was held not to be admissible to prove the defendant's motive for the
attempted robbery. 34
B. Opportunity - Extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove opportu-
nity "in the sense of access to or presence at the scene of the crime or
in the sense of possessing distinctive or unusual skills or abilities em-
ployed in the commission of the crime charged. 35
C. Intent - When a specific mental intent or state of mind is an essen-
tial element of a crime, extrinsic evidence of similar acts is admissible
to prove the defendant's state of mind in the case being adjudicated. 36
D. Knowledge and Plan - In a prosecution for filing a false insur-
ance claim, extrinsic evidence that defendant had previously filed sim-
ilar false claims was admissible to prove intent, knowledge, plan or
scheme.37
E. Identity - Extrinsic evidence that defendant was involved in an-
other robbery, perpetrated in the same manner as the robbery in ques-
tion, is admissible as evidence of identity.38
31. N.C. R. EVID. 404(b).
32. 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET. AL, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinaf-
ter McCormick].
33. State v. Bray, 365 S.E.2d 571 (N.C. App. 1988).
34. State v. Rowland, 366 S.E.2d 550 (N.C. App. 1988).
35. State v. Rowland, 366 S.E.2d 550 (N.C. App. 1988).
36. State v. Hall, 355 S.E.2d 250 (N.C. App. 1987).
37. State v. Melvin, 392 S.E.2d 740 (N.C. App. 1990).
38. State v. McDowell, 378 S.E.2d 48 (N.C. App. 1989).
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F. Absence of Mistake or Accident - Collateral acts or incidents are
admissible to prove that the act in question was not performed inad-
vertently, accidentally, involuntarily, or without guilty knowledge.39
G. Absence Of Entrapment - Extrinsic evidence of the defendant's
drug use and possession on other other occasions is admissible to
prove absence of entrapment on drug charges in the case before the
court.40
Several additional purposes often arise even though they are not
specifically listed in Rule 404(b). They include the "chain of circum-
stances" or res gestae purpose;41 act of ill-will to prove malice;42
unique modus operandi43 and to show a passion for unusual or abnor-
mal sexual relations."
The proponent of "other purposes" evidence (typically, the prose-
cuting attorney) bears the burden of identifying the specific purpose
that the other wrong, crime or act would tend to prove. In appropri-
ate cases, the opponent to the admission of the "other purposes" evi-
dence (typically, the defendant's attorney in a criminal case) should
specifically object to the evidence on the ground that it does not fall
within the "other purposes" clause of Rule 404(b) and, if the court
overrules the objection, the opponent should force the proponent's
attorney to state for the record the specific purpose for which the col-
lateral wrong, crime or act is being offered. There are at least two
advantages that the opponent gains by compelling the proponent to
state the purpose for which the collateral evidence is being tendered.
First, the proponent might not be able to promptly identify the appli-
cable 404(b) purpose. Second, the statement of a particular 404(b)
purpose has the.effect of limiting the use of the evidence to the pur-
pose stated. During closing arguments or on appeal the proponent
may not rely upon a 404(b) purpose that he did not previously
identify.
The party objecting to Rule 404(b) evidence at trial should make a
specific objection by stating that the offer of proof is not admissible
pursuant to Rule 404(b). If the party objecting to the evidence merely
states a general or nonspecific objection ("I object"), the likely conse-
quence on appeal is that the appellate court will uphold the admission
of the evidence by the trial court as long as there is any purpose for
which the collateral wrong, crime or act is admissible.45 Moreover, by
39. 1 McCoMncK, supra note 32, at § 190.
40. State v. Goldman, 389 S.E.2d 281 (N.C. App. 1990).
41. See State v. Agee, 391 S.E.2d 171 (N.C. 1990).
42. See State v. Spruill, 360 S.E.2d 667 (N.C. 1987).
43. See State v. Wortham, 341 S.E.2d 76 (N.C. App. 1986) rev'd, 351 S.E.2d 294 (N.C. 1987).
44. State v. Artis, 384 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1989), vacated, 494 U.S. 1023 (1990).
45. 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 32, at § 52.
[Vol. 21:1
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forcing the proponent of the evidence to explicitly state the purpose
for which the collateral evidence is being offered, the opponent is lay-
ing the foundation for a possible appeal in the event that the propo-
nent failed to state a proper purpose in support of the admission of
the collateral evidence.
IV. DETERMINE THE LOGICAL RELEVANCY AND MATERIALITY OF
THE "OTHER PURPOSES" EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO
RULE 401
The second consideration in analyzing the admissibility of "other
purposes" evidence is to determine whether the collateral wrong,
crime, or act is relevant pursuant to Rule 401 of the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence. Although evidence of a collateral event may fall
within one or more of the other purposes listed in Rule 404(b), evi-
dence of that event is not admissible unless the offer of proof is logi-
cally relevant as defined in Rule 401 of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence: "Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-
mination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence."'  This definition embraces two important
evidentiary concepts - relevancy and materiality. Relevancy means
that an offer of proof has some tendency to prove a factual issue. Ma-
teriality means that a factual issue is pertinent to the claims, charges
or defenses raised in a particular case. Thus, to satisfy the two-fold
requirements of Rule 401, an offer of proof made pursuant to Rule
404(b) must first have a tendency to prove either a listed or unlisted
purpose pursuant to Rule 404(b) and, second, the purpose must fall
within the range of allowable proof as determined by the claims,
charges or defenses in the particular case.
In State v. Rowland, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated:
"Before extrinsic conduct evidence is admissible pursuant to Rule
404(b), the trial court is required to first determine whether conduct is
being offered pursuant to Rule 404(b); second, the trial court is re-
quired to make a determination of the evidence's relevancy., 47 The
North Carolina Supreme Court has described logical relevancy as "the
touchstone" in deciding whether extrinsic evidence is admissible.'
The court has also stated that the "acid test" for determining whether
evidence of collateral events falls within Rule 404(b) is "its logical rel-
46. N.C. R. EviD. 401.
47. 366 S.E.2d 556 (N.C. App. 1980).
48. State v. Fowler, 53 S.E.2d 853, 855 (N.C. 1949).
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evancy to the particular purpose for which it is sought to be
introduced."49
McCormick on Evidence points out that the "other purposes" which
the extrinsic evidence purports to prove must be in dispute:
[T]he connection between the evidence and the permissible purpose
should be clear, and the issue on which the other crimes evidence is
said to bear should be the subject of a genuine controversy. For exam-
ple, if the prosecution maintains that the other crime reveals defend-
ant's guilty state of mind, then his intent must be disputed. Thus, if
the defendant does not deny that the acts were deliberate, then the
prosecution may not introduce the evidence merely to show that the
acts were not accidental. Likewise, if the accused does not deny per-
forming the acts charged, the exceptions pertaining to identification
are unavailing. 50
In determining the probative value of an extrinsic act, the remote-
ness in time of the prior event diminishes its probative value. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has held that evidence of similar prior
sexual assaults by the defendant which happened seven years before
the sexual assault in question was prejudicial to defendant's funda-
mental right to a fair trial because the prior acts were too remote in
time.5 In State v. Stager,2 on the other hand, the Court held that
evidence of the ten year old murder of defendant's first husband was
admissible in defendant's trial for the murder of her second husband.
The courts do not apply a fixed time limit in determining whether a
prior act is too remote. Instead, the remoteness of a prior act affects
the weight and not the admissibility of the prior act.53
V. DETERMINE IF THE "OTHER PURPOSES" EVIDENCE Is
SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT
COMMITTED THE COLLATERAL ACT
The third step in analyzing the admissibility of other wrongs, crimes
or acts evidence is to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to
prove that the party (usually the defendant in a criminal case) actually
committed the collateral act. For a number of years following the en-
actment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the federal courts were di-
vided in assessing the quantum of proof needed to link the defendant
to a collateral act before that collateral act would be admissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 4 In 1988, the United States
49. State v. Jeter, 389 S.E.2d 805 (N.C. 1990).
50. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at § 190.
51. State v. Jones, 369 S.E.2d 622 (N.C. 1988).
52. 406 S.E.2d 876 (N.C. 1991).
53. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at § 190.
54. Huddleston v. U.S., 485 U.S. 681, 686 n.2 (1988).
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Supreme Court addressed this burden of production issue in Huddle-
ston v. United States.55 The Court held:
We conclude that a preliminary finding by the court that the Govern-
ment has proved the act by a preponderance of the evidence is not
called for under Rule 104(a) .... In the Rule 404(b) context, similar
act evidence is relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act
occurred and that the defendant was the actor.
The Court in Huddleston proceeded to adopt the conditional rele-
vancy standard provided in Rule 104(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence:
In determining whether the Government has introduced sufficient evi-
dence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court neither weighs credibility
nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the conditional
fact by a preponderance of the evidence. The court simply examines
all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reason-
ably find the conditional fact ...by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.... Often the trial court may decide to allow the proponent to
introduce evidence concerning a similar act, and at a later point in the
trial assess whether sufficient evidence has been offered to permit the
jury to make the requisite finding.57
Although the Huddleston standard has become known as the "suffi-
ciency of evidence" standard, a careful reading of the case reveals that
the Court actually adopted the Rule 104(b) conditional relevance
standard: "When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfill-
ment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to,
the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the ful-
fillment of the condition.""
The North Carolina Supreme Court has purportedly adopted the
Huddleston burden of production standard. In State v. Stager,59 the
court, per Justice Mitchell, stated:
In Huddleston, the Supreme Court of the United States held that evi-
dence may be admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence if there is sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that
the defendant committed the similar act; no preliminary finding by the
trial court that the defendant actually committed such an act is re-
quired. We find the reasoning of Huddleston compelling and conclude
that evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence if it is substantial evidence tending to support a
reasonable finding by the jury that the defendant committed a similar
act or crime and its probative value is not limited solely to tending to
55. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
56. Id. at 689.
57. Id. at 690.
58. Id. (quoting FED. R. Evm. 104 (b)).
59. 406 S.E.2d 876 (N.C. 1991).
11
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establish the defendant's propensity to commit a crime such as the
crime charged.6°
A collateral wrong, crime or act is therefore admissible under Rule
404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence if the proponent of
the evidence is able to produce "substantial evidence tending to sup-
port a reasonable finding by the jury that the defendant committed a
similar act or crime."' 61 The "substantial evidence" standard is a rela-
tively low threshold requirement. The proponent of the collateral
wrong, crime or act must produce sufficient credible and competent
evidence connecting the defendant to the collateral event so that the
jury's decision on this issue will not be overturned. Although the term
"substantial evidence" gives the impression that an enormous amount
of evidence is required to link the defendant to the collateral event, in
reality, the standard is a low quantum of proof requirement that de-
mands only the production of "some evidence" connecting the de-
fendant to the commission of the collateral event.
It is interesting to note that even though the North Carolina
Supreme Court ostensibly adopted the Huddleston standard in Stager,
the court neither discussed nor invoked the terminology of conditional
relevancy in conjunction with its application of Rule 404(b) to the
facts in Stager.62 Instead, the court coined its own phrase, "substantial
evidence, ' 63 as the standard to be applied in determining whether the
proponent of "other purposes" evidence has produced sufficient evi-
dence to connect the defendant to the collateral event. It should also
be noted that North Carolina Rule 104(b), the conditional relevancy
rule, is identical to its federal counterpart. 64 It appears, though, that
contrary to the rationale of Huddleston, the "substantial evidence"
standard adopted by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Stager,
Agee and Scott is treated as part of a preliminary question analysis
pursuant to Rule 104(a) rather than as a question of conditional rele-
vancy pursuant to Rule 104(b). These two rules operate quite differ-
ently. The trial judge determines the preliminary question of
admissibility under Rule 104(a). 61 "In making its determination [the
trial court] is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with
respect to privileges."66  Conditional relevancy, on the other hand,
authorizes the trial court to admit before the jury evidence of the col-
lateral act before sufficient evidence has been introduced establishing
60. Id. at 890 (citations omitted).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See N.C. R. EVID. 104(b); FED. R. EvrD. 104(b).
65. N.C. R. Evm. 104(a).
66. Id.
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the fact that the defendant actually committed the collateral act.67 If
the proponent does not subsequently offer "sufficient evidence" to
prove that the defendant committed the collateral act, then the condi-
tion has not been fulfilled and the judge should withdraw evidence of
the collateral fact from the jury. 8 The burden is on the opponent,
however, to make a motion to strike evidence of the collateral act if
the proponent does not offer "sufficient evidence" to fulfill the condi-
tion.69 Thus, it appears that North Carolina has adopted the Rule
104(a) approach in determining whether sufficient evidence of the col-
lateral act is available to justify its admission even though the North
Carolina Supreme Court purportedly adopted the Rule 104(b) ap-
proach applied in Huddleston.
VI. DETERMINE WHETHER THE ADMISSION OF THE PRIOR
OFFENSE WOULD BE BARRED BY THE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE OR BY THE DOCTRINE OF
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The issues of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy must be ana-
lyzed when the collateral crime offered into evidence at the present
trial was the subject of a previous adjudication which resulted in an
acquittal. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion and the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel normally
preclude the re-litigation of the issue of guilt once a judgment on a
case or issue has been entered. The preclusive effect of prior adjudi-
cations on the admission of "other purposes" evidence has been the
subject of numerous appellate decisions in both the federal courts and
the courts of North Carolina.
Dowling v. United States7" is a landmark decision of the United
States Supreme Court that addressed the admissibility of collateral of-
fenses against a defendant even though the defendant had been previ-
ously acquitted of those offenses.7' The Court in Dowling provided a
historical frame of reference in addressing this issue:
In Ashe v. Swenson, we recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause
incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In that case, a group
of masked men had robbed six men playing poker in the basement of
a home. The State unsuccessfully prosecuted Ashe for robbing one of
the men. Six weeks later, however, the defendant was convicted for
the robbery of one of the other players. Applying the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel which we found implicit in the Double Jeopardy
67. N.C. R. Evm. 104(b).
68. Id.
69. 1 McCoRmiCK, supra note 32, at § 190.
70. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
71. lId at 347-348.
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Clause, we reversed Ashe's conviction, holding that his acquittal in the
first trial precluded the State from charging him for the second of-
fense. We defined the collateral estoppel doctrine as providing that
"when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid
and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the
same parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe's acquittal in the first trial
foreclosed the second trial because, in the circumstances of that case,
the acquittal verdict could only have meant that the jury was unable to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was one of
the bandits. A second prosecution was impermissible because, to have
convicted the defendant in the second trial, the second jury had to
have reached a directly contrary conclusion.
72
In Dowling, the defendant was charged with armed robbery, which
he committed while wearing a mask.73 As proof of his identity, the
prosecution offered into evidence the testimony of a witness that she
had been robbed in her home by a masked robber approximately two
weeks after the armed robbery in question and that the defendant was
the person who had robbed her.74 The defendant, however, had been
previously acquitted of committing the prior robbery of the female
witness.75 In the Dowling decision, the Court distinguished the facts
in Dowling from the facts in Ashe v. Swenson:
[U]nlike the situation in Ashe v. Swenson, the prior acquittal did not
determine an ultimate issue in the present case.... and we decline to
extend Ashe v. Swenson and the collateral-estoppel component of the
Double Jeopardy Clause to exclude in all circumstances.... relevant
and probative evidence that is otherwise admissible under the Rules
of Evidence simply because it relates to alleged criminal conduct for
which a defendant has been acquitted.76
Thus the critical test under Dowling is whether the prior acquittal
determined an "ultimate issue in the present case."'77 If so, then evi-
dence of the prior offense would be excluded. If not, then evidence of
the prior offense would not be precluded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause or by the doctrine of collateral estoppel even though the de-
fendant was acquitted of committing the alleged prior offense.
The North Carolina Supreme Court was confronted with the preclu-
sive effect of a prior acquittal in State v. Agee.78 The North Carolina
Supreme Court held, per Justice Whichard, that in defendant's crimi-
nal trial for felonious possession of LSD, it was not reversible error
72. Id. (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 344.
74. Id. at 344-345.
75. Id. at 345.
76. Id. at 348 (referring to Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)).
77. Id.
78. 391 S.E.2d 171 (N.C. 1990).
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for the trial court to admit evidence of defendant's possession of mari-
juana to show a chain of circumstances related to the LSD possession
charge despite the fact that the defendant had been previously acquit-
ted of the possession of marijuana charge.79 According to Justice
Whichard, the previous acquittal on the marijuana charge would not
be precluded by "the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as encompassed
by the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy"8 because
"the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present
case."81 Thus, North Carolina case law is consistent with the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court in holding that a defendant's ac-
quittal of a prior criminal act does not automatically preclude the ad-
mission of that evidence in a subsequent adjudication of the same
defendant. Whether evidence of the prior act is admissible, however,
is subject to the "balancing test" found in Rule 403. 2
VII. DETERMINE WHETHER THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE
"OTHER PURPOSES" EVIDENCE IS SUBSTANTIALLY
OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT
PURSUANT TO RULE 403
Fifth, the trial court must determine whether, pursuant to Rule 403
of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence,83 the probative value of the
"other purposes" evidence is substantially outweighed by considera-
tions of unfair prejudice. The balancing test stated in Rule 403 is re-
ferred to as the "legal relevancy" test and should be distinguished
from the "logical relevancy" test stated in Rule 401.81 Rule 403 pro-
vides as follows: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."8' 5
The underlying rationale of Rule 403 is that evidence should be ex-
cluded if there is a substantial risk that the admission of the evidence
might lead to an unfair result. The inherent nature of "other pur-
poses" evidence creates the danger that the introduction of collateral
wrongs, crimes or acts of a defendant in a criminal case might lead the
jury to reach a verdict on an improper basis. Once the jury hears that
the defendant has committed other wrongs, crimes or acts, the danger
79. Id. at 175-176.
80. Id. at 176.
81. Id. (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348 (1990)).
82. N.C. R. Evm. 403.
83. Id.
84. N.C. R. Evm. 401, 403.
85. N.C. R. Evm. 403.
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exists that the jury will intentionally or unwittingly conclude that since
the defendant committed other crimes, he probably committed the
crime in question. Once the jury is made aware of collateral events, it
is difficult to control the manner in which the jury will consider and
weigh that evidence. For this reason, 404(b) evidence should not be
introduced unless it is clear that the prejudicial effect of the "other
purposes" evidence will not substantially outweigh its probative value.
Rule 403 establishes a balancing test between probative value and
the counterweights of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues and
other factors that might cause the jury to reach a verdict on an im-
proper basis. Many of the appellate court decisions that have applied
Rule 403 in conjunction with Rule 404(b) have upheld the introduc-
tion of the "other purposes" evidence on the ground that the proba-
tive value was not substantially outweighed by considerations of
unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. For example, in State v.
Stager, 6 the defendant was on trial for the murder by firearm of her
second husband. At the murder trial, the judge admitted evidence
that the defendant's first husband had also been killed by a firearm
approximately ten years earlier under circumstances similar to the
death of her second husband.' The supreme court, per Justice Mitch-
ell, held that the circumstances surrounding the death of the first hus-
band were admissible in the defendant's trial for the murder of her
second husband to show motive or intent pursuant to Rule 404(b). ss
The court stated that there was substantial evidence linking the de-
fendant to the death of her first husband, 9 despite the fact that she
was never charged or tried for the murder of her first husband. The
court further concluded that the probative value of the collateral
event was not outweighed by considerations of unfair prejudice.'
In State v. Scott,91 the North Carolina Supreme Court reached a dif-
ferent result in balancing the probative value against the prejudicial
effect of the collateral crimes offered into evidence. In Scott, the de-
fendant was tried on several charges including rape, kidnapping and
crime against nature. 2 At the trial, the prosecution introduced the
testimony of a witness (not the prosecuting witness) that two years
earlier, the defendant had raped her under circumstances similar to
the alleged rape for which the defendant was then on trial.93 The de-
86. 406 S.E.2d 876 (N.C. 1991).
87. Id. at 891.
88. Id. at 892-893.
89. Id. at 891.
90. Id. at 893-894.
91. 413 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 1992).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 788.
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fendant had been tried and acquitted of the alleged prior rape.94 In a
carefully written opinion, Chief Justice Exum, speaking for the major-
ity of the court, stated:
We conclude that evidence that defendant committed a prior alleged
offense for which he has been tried and acquitted may not be admitted
in a subsequent trial for a different offense when its probative value
depends, as it did here, upon the proposition that defendant in fact
committed the prior crime. To admit such evidence violates, as a mat-
ter of law, Evidence Rule 403.95
The court concluded:
The North Carolina Rules of Evidence must be interpreted and ap-
plied in light of this proposition: an acquittal and the undefeated pre-
sumption of innocence it signifies mean that, in law, defendant did not
commit the crime charged. When the probative value of evidence of
this other conduct depends upon the proposition that defendant com-
mitted the prior crime, his earlier acquittal of that crime so erodes the
probative value of the evidence that its potential for prejudice, which
is great, must perforce outweigh its probative value under Rule 403.96
The court reversed the kidnapping and rape convictions but upheld
the crime against nature conviction. 7 The court's rationale was that
evidence of the prior sexual offense (for which the defendant had
been acquitted) pertained to the issue of consent in the second case.98
Consent is not a defense to a crime against nature charge and the
impermissible admission of the prior offense evidence did not taint the
crime against nature conviction. 9
The court's decision in Scott would appear to be in conflict with its
decision in Agee, discussed in Section VI above. The court attempted
to distinguish the two cases on both the facts and the law. In a dis-
senting opinion to the majority opinion in Scott, Justice Meyer points
out that the majority opinion in Scott appears to be a departure from
the court's traditional analysis of collateral estoppel and of the balanc-
ing test found in Rule 403.100 The majority opinion in Scott does, in-
deed, represent an apparent change in the court's approach in
analyzing the admissibility of "other purposes" evidence pursuant to
Rules 404(b) and 403. All too often in the past, appellate courts in
North Carolina have merely "rubberstamped" the admission of "other
purposes" evidence without carefully weighing the probative value of
the evidence against its prejudicial effect to determine if the probative
94. Id,
95. Id.
96. Id. at 790.
97. Id. at 791.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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value is "substantially outweighed" by the prejudicial effect of admit-
ting the evidence. In the Stager decision, for example, Justice Mitch-
ell, in writing the majority opinion, cursorily concluded that the
probative value of admitting the circumstances of the prior death by
firearm of the defendant's first husband was not outweighed by preju-
dice.'' The opinion does not reflect a careful balancing of probity
versus prejudice. In Scott, on the other hand, Chief Justice Exum
carefully analyzed and applied the balancing test found in Rule 403 in
concluding that evidence of a prior alleged crime for which the de-
fendant had been acquitted should be excluded with respect to some
of the charges, but admitted with respect to other charges. 0 2 The
Scott decision hopefully establishes a higher standard of scrutiny in
applying Rule 403 to determine the admissibility of "other purposes"
evidence. The significance of Scott should not be limited to cases that
involve prior acquittals. Rather, the lesson to be learned from Scott is
that trial courts and appellate courts should engage in a careful and
thoughtful balancing process in determining whether to admit "other
purposes" evidence pursuant to Rule 403.
VIII. APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY
PURSUANT To RULE 105
The sixth step in determining the admissibility of "other purposes"
evidence arises from the application of the doctrine of limited admissi-
bility found in Rule 105 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. 10 3
The rule provides as follows: "When evidence which is admissible as
to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party
or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall re-
strict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly."'"
The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 105 of the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence state in pertinent part:
A close relationship exists between this rule and Rule 403 which re-
quires exclusion when "probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury." The present rule recognizes the practice of admitting evi-
dence for a limited purpose and instructing the jury accordingly. The
availability and effectiveness of this practice must be taken into con-
sideration in reaching a decision whether to exclude for unfair preju-
dice under Rule 403.05
101. State v. Stager, 406 S.E.2d 876, 893-94 (N.C. 1991).
102. State v. Scott, 413 S.E.2d 787, 790-91 (N.C. 1992).
103. N.C. R. EVID. 105.
104. Id.
105. N.C. R. Evm. 105 advisory committee's note.
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Evidence which is admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b) may be consid-
ered by the jury only to the extent that it proves one or more of the
"other purposes" for which it was admitted. "Other purposes" evi-
dence may not be considered by the jury as proof that the defendant
may have acted at the time in question in a manner consistent with her
character. As stated earlier, the propensity rule' °6 excludes the intro-
duction of circumstantial character evidence. Normally, the judge re-
stricts the jury's consideration of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts by giving a limiting instruction to the jury. The essence of the
limiting instruction is that the jury may consider evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts of the defendant only for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the prosecution has established proof of specific
"other purposes" pursuant to Rule 404(b). Evidence of other wrongs
may not be considered by the jury for the purpose of determining
whether the defendant acted in conformity with any predisposed char-
acter traits.
In State v. Stager,10 7 (the murder case in which the defendant-wife
was found guilty of murdering her second husband), the trial court did
not give a limiting instruction to the jury concerning the purposes for
which it could consider the circumstances surrounding the death of
the defendant's first husband. Presumably, the jury considered the ev-
idence surrounding the first husband's death for any and all purposes.
Despite the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction, the
supreme court held that a limiting instruction is not required "unless
specifically requested by counsel."' 8 The court's ruling in this regard
is consistent with Rule 105 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence
which provides that a limiting instruction shall be given "upon re-
quest"'10 9 in an appropriate situation. The danger exists, however, that
in the absence of a limiting instruction, the jury will probably consider
the "other purposes" evidence as circumstantial character evidence - a
result that would clearly violate the propensity rule.
IX. CONCLUSION
The admission of "other purposes" evidence pursuant to Rule
404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence raises a substantial
danger that in criminal cases in particular, jurors will misuse evidence
of the defendant's past conduct as propensity evidence. Rule 404(b) is
essentially a "prosecutor's rule" that enables the prosecutor to intro-
duce character evidence before the jury disguised as "other purposes"
106. N.C. R. Ev'D. 404(a).
107. 406 S.E.2d 876 (N.C. 1991).
108. Id. at 894.
109. N.C. R. Evm. 105.
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evidence. It is incumbent on the courts and attorneys to protect
against the improper use of Rule 404(b). If applied properly, the six-
step process discussed in this article provides a systematic approach
that courts may follow in determining the admissibility of "other pur-
poses" evidence while at the same time safeguarding the procedural
due process rights of litigants, especially defendants in criminal cases.
To further ensure the rights of defendants in criminal cases, the North
Carolina General Assembly should amend Rule 404(b) by adding a
notice provision similar to the notice provision added to Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b)" 0 in 1991. This provision should require the pros-
ecution in criminal cases to give reasonable notice to the defendant,
prior to trial, of the prosecution's intended use of "other purposes"
evidence. The notice requirement would eliminate the element of sur-
prise and it would expedite the hearing and resolution of pre-trial mo-
tions in limine based on Rule 404(b) and related considerations.
During the course of or subsequent to pretrial hearings, the trial judge
would be able to carefully consider and analyze the legal and eviden-
tiary issues that are involved in ruling on the admissibility of "other
purposes" evidence. Under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b)
as presently written, the prosecution is not required to provide prior
notice of its intention to introduce collateral wrongs, crimes or acts of
the defendant into evidence. Thus, the issue does not normally arise
until the prosecution makes an offer of proof pursuant to Rule 404(b).
At that time, defense counsel objects and the trial court niakes an
immediate ruling concerning the admissibility of the "other purposes"
evidence. This approach does not lend itself to the kind of methodical
evaluation of the facts and of the applicable evidentiary rules that
Rule 404(b) demands. The combination of a reasonable notice provi-
sion and the application of the six-step process in determining the ad-
missibility of Rule 404(b) evidence would militate against the
improper use of "other purposes" evidence by the jury and ensure
fairness to all litigants.
110. FED. R. EvD. 404(b).
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